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Abstract:
Interorganizational network structure can be modified by the actions of key actors. This paper presents a set 
of strategies for detecting those actors through Social Network Analysis. To that end the potential of centrality 
measures, the Key Player Problem and the power of graphic visualization for identifying such actors and deter-
mining their ability to generate changes in network structures are introduced. To test the hypothesis under study 
five interorganizational networks made up of 32 cultural organizations are analyzed. Four types of key player are 
identified: (a) central actors; (b) intermediary actors; (c) disseminators; and (d) brokers. Each type has a distinct 
ability to influence network structures. The Structural Social Capital (SSC) in networks is examined in order to 
identify the elements that characterize each type of key actor. To that end, structural hole measures are evaluated. 
Two multiple regression models are developed to learn what factors influence SSC. Results show centrality and 
brokerage have positive impacts on SSC while density and constraint have negative effects. Finally the potential 
of each group of key actors for implementing strategies focused on optimizing inter-organizational networks is 
discussed.
Keywords:
Broker, interorganizational networks, key player, structural holes, structural social capital, social network 
analysis.
Resumen:
La estructura de las redes inter-organizativas puede modificarse por la acción de actores clave. En este 
artículo se presentan un conjunto de estrategias para detectar a estos actores a través del Análisis de Redes So-
ciales. Para alcanzar este objetivo introducimos el potencial de las medidas de centralidad, el problema del actor 
clave y el poder de la visualización de grafos para identificar a los actores clave y determinar su capacidad para 
generar cambios en las redes. Para testar las hipótesis de trabajo son analizadas cinco redes inter-organizativas 
conformadas por 32 organizaciones culturales. Identificamos cuatro tipos de actores clave que hemos llamado: 
(a) centrales; (b) intermediarios, (c) difusores y (d) brókeres. Cada tipo tiene una capacidad diferencial para 
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incidir en la estructura de las redes. Con el objetivo de identificar los elementos que caracterizan a cada tipo, 
analizamos el Capital Social Estructural (CSE) presente en las redes examinadas. Para ello se evaluaron las me-
didas que analizan la existencia de agujeros estructurales. Para conocer los factores que influyen en la creación 
de CSE desarrollamos dos modelos de regresión múltiple. Los resultados muestran que la centralidad y la inter-
mediación inciden positivamente en la generación de CSE, mientras que la densidad y la constricción afectan de 
forma negativa. Finalmente se discute el potencial de cada grupo de actores clave para implementar estrategias 
centradas en optimizar redes inter-organizativas. 
Palabras clave: 
Actor clave, Agujeros estructurales, Análisis de redes sociales, Bróker, Capital social estructural, Redes 
inter-organizativas.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is expanding in a broad range of disciplines, and can 
now be said to have spread to the academic community. Its adoption has been especially 
productive in Social Sciences (Borgatti et al. 2009). The core elements of SNA include 
the following: (a) it is focused on the structure of relationships between a set of actors; (b) 
it uses empirical data; (c) it is supported by mathematical algorithms; (d) it employs dia-
grams to represent network structures; (e) it generates specific indicators; and (f) it creates 
its own terms to explain network features (Wasserman and Faust 1994).
Despite the increasing development of SNA, there is still some confusion as to how 
to interpret network measures and graph visualizations. It must be taken into account that 
the proper interpretation of diagrams requires knowledge of qualitative data and accurate 
information as to context. The most common critique received by SNA studies is perhaps 
that they are excessively descriptive in nature, although the paradigm has great explana-
tory potential which is often not thoroughly exploited (Provan et al. 2009, p. 890). This 
phenomenon is observed in SNA studies designed to assess inter-organizational networks 
and partnerships. In this particular context, the main problem is to answer the following 
questions: What is the minimum density needed to ensure effective communication between 
network members? What degree of centralization should be given to ensure that coordina-
tion occurs successfully? How many actors should be located at the core and the periphery 
to foster the equilibrium of the structure? By analyzing relational data it is possible to ob-
tain a plethora of whole network measures and information about nodes. Nevertheless it is 
important to know how to interpret network indicators in order to evaluate and optimize the 
social systems under study. At the same time access to information on context is needed. It 
is also important to know details of previous paths of collaboration between organizations.
To date there are few studies that systematize the interpretation of structural measures 
to analyze specific contexts. Provan et al. (2007) provides a systematic review to identify 
the main measures applied to evaluate whole networks2. Other publications summarize 
some structural analysis techniques which may be helpful in increasing the effectiveness 
of intervention programs (Gest et al. 2011; Valente et al. 2015). In another study Feinberg 
et al. (2005) implement an SNA study to evaluate a partnership created to deliver health 
services. Earlier studies have presented methods for detecting subgroups and whole net-
work indicators related to community coalition functioning (Ramos-Vidal 2015a) and pub-
lic-sector policy assessment (Ramos-Vidal 2015b). 
Interdependence is one of the classical principles of SNA. This implies that the actions 
of a single actor may influence the behavior of other network members and vice-versa. At 
the same time, the whole system structure affects ties between individuals in a network 
(Mitchell 1969). This basic premise assumes that actors have some power to influence the 
overall network structure. This research focuses specifically on this topic. The objectives of 
this paper are: (1) to analyze the influence of a set of nodes to modify inter-organizational 
networks structure; (2) to provide helpful procedures for identifying key actors; and (3) to 
2  Within SNA two main levels of analysis are usually considered: Whole networks and Egocentric networks. Whole 
networks evaluate relationships between a defined set of actors. Egocentric networks are focused on direct ties 
established by a single actor (ego) with other network members (alter).
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introduce measures and concepts linked to Structural Social Capital (SSC) that enable the 
potential of key nodes to determine inter-organizational network structures to be assessed. 
We use data from our previous research to evaluate different types of relationship between 
organizations that form an inter-organizational network in the performing arts sector in 
Andalusia (Spain). The next section shows the influence of individual actors on the whole 
network configuration. 
1.1. Individual impact on social structure
Social network configuration is the product of interactions between nodes integrated 
into a social system. Therefore the deletion –or addition- of new ties or new nodes can 
transform the structure of entire networks (Knoke and Yang 2008). This means that each 
network member has some power to modify network structure. However, not all actors 
have the same ability to influence structural properties and social network evolution. 
The analysis of the traffic of information is a key element for detecting potentially pow-
erful actors (Pettigrew 1972). Individuals situated in betweenness positions are considered 
as natural brokers, introducing new information into the subgroups to which they connect. 
Brokers can also act as opinion leaders and triggers for changes and innovations (Burt 
1999). Access to diverse flows of information could improve the decision making process 
at individual and collective levels. For example, within an organization individuals who 
are the nexus between subunits and departments are usually powerful (Brass and Burkhardt 
1993). Other classic studies have evidenced the importance of having access to heteroge-
neous groups through weak ties to achieve better positions in labor markets (Granovetter 
1973).
Most studies focused on the inter-organizational level analyze factors that explain (a) 
the rise of strategic alliances (Uzzi 1997); (b) the genesis of trust between members (Za-
heer and Venkatraman 1995); and (c) the acquisition of competitive advantages (Dyer and 
Singh 1998). But there is little research that empirically evaluates the influence of a small 
set of organizations on the evolution of interorganizational networks. This, along with the 
increase in the number of such structures now operating in a globalized environment, jus-
tifies developing strategies to identify the role assumed by each organization within part-
nerships.
Some research shows that changes in networks are often orchestrated by a small num-
ber of actors whose actions promote changes at network level (Owen-Smith and Powell 
2004; Danaraj and Parkhe 2006). Provan et al. (2007) describe the mechanisms that explain 
why a set comprising a small number of organizations has a greater capacity for influencing 
the structure and evolution of socio-centric networks:  
“A key group of nodes (organizations) within the network and their lead-
ers often play a central role as the main carriers of those rules and practices, 
often reflecting the environment in which they are situated […]. The prac-
tices and commitments of those key nodes may result in the development of 
dominant logics at the network and community levels […]. In other words, a 
dominant core within the network may drive how the network develops and/
or evolves” (p. 502).
Ignacio Ramos-Vidal
ISSN: 1131 - 6837  Cuadernos de Gestión Vol. 17 - Nº 2 (2017), pp. 63-86 67
The next section explains the connections between SNA and the genesis of Structural 
Social Capital (SSC). This kind of social capital is a helpful concept in understanding what 
factors determine the success of individuals and organizations depending on their abilities 
to access innovations and non-redundant information (Granovetter 1973; Burt 1992; Ra-
mos-Vidal 2015c). 
1.2. Competitive advantages and SSC
SSC is a construct which has captured the attention of many researchers for its poten-
tial to explain the importance of relationships by generating added value. The conceptual 
framework of SSC may explain why some organizations get better results than others. At 
individual level, SSC describes how single organizations leverage the knowledge and skills 
of their members to climb to higher positions within markets. At collective level, SSC en-
ables us to describe roles played by whole structures for generating ideas and new knowl-
edge. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) claim that SSC is an important source of intellectual 
capital in organizational settings. This process explains why corporate clusters generate 
innovations, making it possible to secure competitive advantages.  
Ronald Burt is perhaps the author who has contributed most to the operationalization 
of SSC. A key concept of his theory is the notion of structural holes. According to Burt 
(1992, p. 18) a structural hole is the separation between nonredundant contacts: Assuming 
that non redundant contacts are connected by a structural hole, a structural hole is a rela-
tionship of non redundancy between two contacts. This concept is outstanding because the 
lack of links between actors –a structural hole- may result in aditional profits for the entire 
network. The presence of structural holes implies relationships within networks that are 
non redundant, so the information flowing through the network is not repeated. There are 
several measures for evaluating structural holes, including the indicators presented in Table 
1. These indicators are used to evaluate the SSC of each actor, on the basis that it is possible 
to isolate the ties of an actor within networks.
Table 1
Description of measures and formulas for calculating variables under study
Indicators Description Formula
Centrality
Number of links established by an 
actor. This measure it is positive-
ly related to the capacity of action 
deployed by organizations. However 
redundant ties have the opposite effect 
by offering repeated information. 
d(ni)= Number of nodes to which ego is 
connected.
g= Number of nodes in the network 
(network size).
Standardized formula:
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𝐿𝐿
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3 Borgatti (1997) provides a critical review of the redundancy measures developed in Ron Burt’s (1992) 
Structural Holes Theory. 
4 There is another form of SSC named Bonding Social Capital. This kind of SSC often gains profits from 
high relationship densities, tie strength and transitivity. For example, in certain sectors it is positive to 
show local structures with high levels of cohesion. This phenomenon is common in traditional sectors 
(e.g. small craft firms). In such environments, which are usually characterized by a local business 
projection, management practices often require high levels of trust and commitment (Crowe 2007). This 
clarification is made in answer to a relevant comment by an anonymous reviewer.  
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Effective size
Number of alters –weighted by tie 
strength- to which ego is connected and 
has the potential to minimize the redun-
dancy of relationships. An increase in 
access to new sources of information 
takes place because the actor may affect 
the number of subgroups to which ego 
is connected.
Effective size3 is the number of alters 
minus the average degree of alters within 
the ego network, not counting ties to ego. 
    (Eq.1)
            (Eq.2)
    (Eq.3)
Constraint
Burt’s constraint measure (equation 2.4, 
p. 55 of Burt, 1992). Essentially this is a 
measure of the extent to which ego is in-
vested in people who are invested in other 
ego’s alters. 
Degree in which the network of “i“ in-
vests directly or indirectly in the network 
of actor “j, where Pij is the proportion of 
time and resources invested by actor “i” 
in actor “j”.
Betweenness
This shows the times when an actor is 
located on the shortest path (geodesic 
distance) between two pairs of nodes. 
Organizations with high between-
ness are able to influence an actor’s 
behavior because they can control the 
communication flows between diffe-
rent clusters and hence they have the 
potential to access more resources. 
Gjk= Number of geodesic paths that link 
“j” to “k”.
Gjk (ni) = Number of geodesic paths bet-
ween “j” and “k” that pass through “i”. 
Standardized formula:
Density
This shows the total number of ties 
divided by the total number of possi-
ble ties. This indicator is negatively 
related to SSC. The higher the density, 
the more likely ties between organiza-
tions are to be redundant4.
Density is calculated by dividing the 
number of connections “L” by the num-
ber of possible arcs g (g-1). 
34
Source: Own work based on Ron Burt’s (1992) seminal research.
Figure 1 explains Burt’s (1992) Structural Holes Theory visually. Two examples of 
networks are presented to show how the position of an actor within social networks is 
related to SSC. 
3 Borgatti (1997) provides a critical review of the redundancy measures developed in Ron Burt’s (1992) Structural 
Holes Theory.
4 There is another form of SSC named Bonding Social Capital. This kind of SSC often gains profits from high 
relationship densities, tie strength and transitivity. For example, in certain sectors it is positive to show local structures 
with high levels of cohesion. This phenomenon is common in traditional sectors (e.g. small craft firms). In such 
environments, which are usually characterized by a local business projection, management practices often require 
high levels of trust and commitment (Crowe 2007). This clarification is made in answer to a relevant comment by 
an anonymous reviewer.
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Figure 1
Illustration of Burt’s (1992) Structural Holes Theory
Source: Own elaboration.
In Figure 1.a node A maintains three connections which in turn connect node A to three 
non-overlapping subgroups. Nevertheless, node A in Figure 1.b maintains three links with-
in a single cohesive network. Burt’s theory shows that actors who have access to different 
subgroups (which are not connected to each other) have more options to acquire better 
information and innovations than actors embedded in cohesive networks.  
Ahuja (2000) studies this topic in regard to chemical industry firms. His conclusions 
underline the prominent role of structural holes in explaining the adoption of innovations. 
The results show that organizations which occupy bridging positions act as early adopt-
ers of innovative processses. Zaheer and Bell (2005) reach similar conclusions in regard 
to Canadian financial companies. Other studies highlight that network structures have to 
combine structural holes (to facilitate the creation of innovations) with a minimum level of 
internal cohesion to ease and smooth coordination within networks (Burt 2000; Sytch et al. 
2012). A set of strategies for identifying key actors is shown in the next section. 
2. TECHNIQUES FOR DETECTING KEY ACTORS
One of the main distinctive features of SNA is its ability to generate indicators to assess 
whole network structural properties (cohesion measures) and individual actors (central-
ity measures). Cohesion measures are indicators of the entire network while centrality 
measures assess the positioning of individual actors. This article focuses on analyzing the 
changes induced by individual actors in whole network parameters. To that end, centrality 
measures of individual actors are analyzed first. Then the changes in cohesion measures 
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Figure 1 explains Burt’s (1992) Structural Holes Theory visually. Two examples of networks are presented 
to show how the position of an actor within social networks is related to SSC.  
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that result from deleting different sets of key actors are examined. The next section de-
scribes indicators of centrality designed to evaluate the prominence of actors, then a com-
plementary technique for detecting influential actors is presented (Borgatti 2006).
2.1. Centrality measures
Centrality parameters serve to compare the individual positions of actors within social 
networks (Freeman 1979). Each actor has a different power to affect network structures 
depending on the role assumed in the whole structure. As a result, all nodes are interdepen-
dent on each other. To learn the internal dynamics of interaction the characteristics of ac-
tors with the greatest potential to define network structure is evaluated. The measures used 
to explain structural influences processes are Degree and Betweenness centrality (Freeman 
1979; Wasserman and Faust 1994).
Degree is a measure that comprises two independent parameters: Indegree (received 
nominations) and Outdegree (sent nominations). Degree is the measure that best explains 
the power of actors in social networks. Central actors are directly connected with many 
actors, so they are able to reach several nodes via direct paths. Occupying central positions 
has different effects depending on the kind of relationship analyzed. Being a central node 
in networks in which actors exchange confidential information could have positive effects 
on business strategy, whereas being a central node in a network of organizations character-
ized by unethical business practices could result in negative effects on reputation. 
Betweenness represents the extent to which an actor occupies strategic positions. 
Betweenness refers to the times when an actor is situated on the shortest path (geodesic 
distance) between pairs of actors. Nodes with high betweenness have many options for 
connecting subgroups. Such nodes may be influential actors because they may control the 
information and resources that flow across linkages. The next subsection presents alterna-
tive procedures for detecting key actors in social networks.
2.2. The Key Player Problem
Centrality measures offer valuable clues for identifying influential actors, but there are 
other measures that add effective solutions adapted to meet specific needs for detecting 
key players. Borgatti and other colleagues developed the Keyplayer software to close this 
gap (Borgatti and Dreyfus 2003; Borgatti 2006). They recognized certain limitations of 
centrality parameters in identifying key actors, and developed a technique for solving a 
two-fold dilemma5:
(1) Which actors are best able to disseminate information, resources, and ideas through 
the network?
(2) Which are the actors whose removal has the greatest power to fragment the struc-
ture? 
5  Borgatti (2006) refers to both questions jointly as the Key Player Problem (KPP). He defines the Key Player 
Problem Positive (KPP+) to identify the set of actors that can act as disseminators, and the Key Player Problem 
Negative (KPP-) to detect actors whose removal has the most power to fragment social structures.  
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The answers to both these questions have multiples applications in social science, e.g. 
learning which actors are able to disseminate messages and good practices has notable 
advantages in fields such as public health (e.g. in reducing response time on implementing 
new protocols) and in management science (e.g. in increasing the speed at which pro-
duction innovations are adopted). Being able to identify actors whose removal fragments 
the structure may serve to reduce the power of organizations that exert control over local 
markets. The mathematical foundations of each procedure are not explained in this paper, 
but it may be desirable to look in more depth at the practical solutions to both questions. 
2.2.1. Looking for disseminators (KPP+)
KPP+ alludes to identifying the smallest set of key players (Kp set+) that is maximally 
connected to the rest of the nodes in a network (Borgatti 2006, p. 22). It is possible to con-
sider that this small set will comprise actors with a high degree of centrality6. These mea-
sures could guide selection in the early stages, but they are not always effective in detecting 
actors with high dissemination power because cohesion measures do not take into account 
the structural equivalence of the actors who make up the Kp set. This means that if only the 
subgroup of n actors with highest centrality is identified they actors are likely to share the 
same contacts with third parties. Thus, actors are structurally equivalent and many contacts 
are redundant. If the set of key actors is chosen solely on the basis of centrality measures, 
other actors are not selected, even if they do not maintain many links but are connected to 
other actors who are not accessible through central nodes. To identify the members of the 
KP set, the Keyplayer program considers graph theory and the principles of centrality of 
groups and classes. This last concept expresses the idea that the centrality of a subset may 
be greater than the aggregate centrality of actors (Everett and Borgatti 1999).
2.2.2. Identifying brokers (KPP-)
The second dilemma for detecting key actors involves choosing a subset of actors (Kp 
set) whose removal results in a residual graph with the lowest possible cohesion. By de-
tecting -and subsequently deleting- these actors from the network, the aim is to disconnect 
the graph removing the smallest possible number of nodes. As indicated previously, it 
might make sense to select actors with high betweenness. However, as also noted above, 
centrality parameters are not designed for this purpose so the detection of both types of KP 
set and the identification of the actors with the greatest centrality and betweenness may be 
a suitable option for implementing structural intervention strategies.
3. METHOD
The concepts and techniques presented are illustrated by studying data from a case 
study covering six kinds of relationship between 32 cultural organizations (Ramos-Vidal 
6  The measure used to calculate the Kp set of potential disseminators is Closeness Centrality. 
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and Maya-Jariego 2013). The relationships assessed in this research represent different 
types of link, from relationships that require no commitment to ones that require some 
degree of formalization (e.g. joint participation in projects)7. According to Barringer and 
Harrison (2000), to learn what constellation of interactions is shaping inter-organizational 
networks, different types of link should be analyzed. A member of each organization pro-
vides information about the relationships that his/her organization maintains with other 
organizations registered on the same public census. Six types of relationship are analyzed, 
each of which gives rise to a different network. Participants assess tie strength from 0 (no 
relationship) to 3 (highly intense contacts). The network of recognition between members 
is excluded because it shows a high level of density. The design of the research is described 
below. 
The first step is to calculate cohesion measures. Density reflects the total number of ties 
divided by the total number of possible ties. Centralization analyzes the degree to which 
relationships are concentrated on a few actors. Reciprocity shows the degree to which ties 
are returned to the sender. A clique is a subgroup comprising at least three actors who are 
maximally connected (full triad). 
Centrality measures are calculated to identify a subset formed by the four actors with 
the greatest centrality and a subset of four actors with the highest betweenness. The Key-
player program (version 1.45) is used to detect KP sets of potential disseminators and 
brokers8. Afterwards all four subgroups of actors with the greatest centrality, betweenness 
and the subgroups of disseminators (Kp set+) and brokers (Kp set-) are independently de-
leted in each network. Next, cohesion parameters are calculated again after removing each 
subgroup. This procedure enables us to test for different effects of such subset on the whole 
network structure (Borgatti and Everett 2006).
Next we estimate several measures aimed at checking for structural holes (Burt 1992)9. 
This step is carried out on all five networks evaluated. For each indicator a new variable is 
created built up from the aggregation of values in each network. Next, two regression mod-
els are drawn up to test two hypotheses. The study hypotheses are designed to assess the 
impact exerted by key actors on network structure in terms of opportunities to create SSC: 
H1: Centrality and Betweenness will exert a positive influence on SSC. 
H2: Density and constriction will exert a negative influence on SSC. 
Finally, the core-periphery structure is calculated for all the networks assessed (Bor-
gatti and Everett 1999). This analysis is performed to identify actors located in the core 
and the periphery. This step enables us to detect whether the four subsets of key actors 
tend to occupy core or peripheral positions. Empirical evidence suggests that actors who 
determine network structures are usually located at the core while peripheral actors usually 
play a secondary role in the evolution of the system (Provan et al. 2007; Ramos-Vidal and 
Maya-Jariego 2013; Ramos-Vidal 2015c). Visone software is utilized for graph visualiza-
7  The socio-centric assessment questionnaire applied in this research is available in Appendix I of Ramos-Vidal (2015b).
8  The selection of subsets of four actors is justified because some studies suggest that structural changes are usually 
conducted by no more than 20% of network members (Valente et al. 2008).
9  Structural hole measures are individually calculated for each actor using Ucinet (Borgatti et al. 2002). See 
Burt (1992), Borgatti et al. (1998) and Ramos-Vidal (2015c) for a more precise description of indicators and the 
relationships maintained with inter-organizational network evolution and SSC at individual and collective levels.
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tion (Baur et al. 2001). To learn more about the individual positioning of each key player 
subset, the core and periphery are differentiated. The final step (Figures 3 and 4) shows 
ego-networks of a single organization representing each subset so that qualitative compar-
isons can be made. 
4. RESULTS
Following the sequence presented in the previous section, Table 2 shows the cohesion 
measures found. Whole network indicators are presented first, then the successive rows 
show structural parameters again after each subgroup of key actors is deleted. 
Table 2 shows the power of a subset of central actors to modify network structural prop-
erties. Significant decreases in density and in the number of cliques are observed when the 
subgroup of central actors is removed. This may be due to the fact that central actors base 
their power on the number of direct ties that they maintain. If this subgroup is deleted the 
whole network structure tends to be fragmented. The group with the second greatest power 
to alter structural parameters comprises intermediaries. The influence of intermediaries 
is less than that of central actors, but density and centralization levels are reduced if this 
subset is deleted. 
The subgroups of brokers and disseminators are quite different. If both subgroups are 
removed from the graph there are no major changes in the parameters assessed, except 
that the subset of brokers shows a slight potential for modifying the number of cliques. 
Nonetheless this subgroup shares some members with the subgroup of centrals. Table 3 
identifies organizations that belong to each subset of key actors. Subgroups of centrals and 
brokers share members in all networks. This is logical if the (small) size of the network and 
the (high) level of Outdegree centralization are considered.
We also select a small proportion of actors to explain the potential influence exerted by 
such subset. If the number of members of each group is increased the level of overlapping 
and the composition of each subgroup becomes more heterogeneous. Table 4 shows de-
scriptive statistics of aggregated measures checking for structural holes. Bivariate correla-
tions between variables are shown in Table 5.    
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics of the indicators assessed
Indicators Min. Max. M SD
Degree 4 93 50.03 26.75
Effective size 5 62 33.41 16.06
Constriction .87 5.68 2.18 1.1
Betweenness 0 283.60 74.36 71.24
Density .152 (15.2%) .300 (30%) 220.8 (22.08%) 36.86 
Source: Own elaboration.
There are interesting associations between study variables. Degree of centrality and 
Betweenness are correlated because the more links an actor maintains the more likely it is 
that one or more of those links is connected to several subgroups. 
Table 5
Correlations between variables included in the analysis
Indicators 1 2 3 4 5
1. Degree --
2. Effective size .91** --
3. Constriction -.81** -.80** --
4. Betweenness .78** .77** -.55** --
5. Density -.36* -.44* .55** -.41* --
**p<.001; *p<.05
Source: Own elaboration.
Effective size is negatively related to density and constriction. A high level of density 
and transitivity may be hindering the emergence of structural holes. Regression analysis 
coefficients are shown in Table 6. 
The first regression model confirms the first hypothesis. The model summary shows 
how the positions of brokerage and centrality influence effective size, which is the most 
telltale sign of SSC. This suggests that central and intermediary actors are crucial for de-
veloping structural intervention strategies. On the other hand, the intense relationship may 
reflect that both (a) the number of ties; and (b) the power to connect subgroups are major 
elements for creating structural holes. 
The second regression model is designed to test the effects of density and constriction on 
effective size. We find that density and the extent to which the links that provide access to in-
formation sources are concentrated in a few actors have a negative influence on effective size. 
This finding is relevant because effective size is the optimal configuration for maximizing the 
harnessing of links. A highly cohesive network increases the chances of links being transitive and 
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redundant. This type of structure decreases the chance of there being structural holes which could 
be exploited by different organizations to gain access to new resources. The same applies in the 
case of constriction. Organizations that concentrate their relationships on a small number of actors 
increase their dependence on those actors, which may diminish their capacity for action. The posi-
tions occupied by each subset of key actors are analyzed through graph visualizations.
Table 6
Summary and coefficients of regression models
Model Independent variables
Dependent variables
Effective size
R² ΔR² DF* Β F
1 - Degree- Betweenness .839*** .828*** 31 .790*** 75.596
2 - Density- Constriction .701** .681** 31 -.553** 34.044
** p < .001; *** p < .0001; *DF: Degrees of Freedom
Source: Own elaboration.
Positioning analysis reveals that all four groups share members. This explains why 
influence processes conducted by disseminators and brokers need to have the support of 
actors who have established a large number of links with cohesive subsets located in the 
core. At the same time, it may be positive to involve other actors who maintain weak con-
nections with multiple peripheral subgroups.  
Figure 2 illustrates the network of formal contacts between cultural organizations. 
Black nodes represent central actors and white nodes represent peripheral actors. A cat-
egorical core-periphery model (Borgatti and Everett, 1999) is computed to differentiate 
between the two structures using Ucinet software (Borgatti et al. 2002).
Figure 2
Inter-organizational network of formal contacts distinguishing between core and peripheral actors
Note: Isolated nodes have been deleted 
Source: Own elaboration.
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Inter-organizational network of formal contacts distinguishing between core and peripheral actors 
 
Note: Isolated nodes have been deleted  
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Figure 2 represents how central actors deploy multiples links with other actors situated in the core, and at the 
same time maintain links with peripheral nodes. To accurately learn what links are established by each 
subgroup, the relationships of an organization which is representative of each subset of key actors are 
isolated in Figures 3 and 4. By extracting the relationship of a single organization the ego-centric network 
structure is represented. Larger nodes represent Ego. 
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Figure 2 represents how central actors deploy multiples links with other actors situated 
in the core, and at the same time maintain links with peripheral nodes. To accurately learn 
what links are established by each subgroup, the relationships of an organization which is 
representative of each subset of key actors are isolated in Figures 3 and 4. By extracting 
the relationship of a single organization the ego-centric network structure is represented. 
Larger nodes represent Ego.
Figure 3
Egocentric networks representing the subgroups of centrals and intermediaries
Source: Own elaboration.
There are obvious differences between the egocentric networks representing each sub-
group of key actors. Organization 7 (which belongs to the central subset) maintains several 
formal contacts with multiple nodes. It is connected to nineteen organizations (thirteen 
centrals and six peripherals), so its power of influence is greater in the core structure, 
where there are highly intense links. The situation is different in the case of Organization 
22 (subset of intermediaries), which has eleven links, i.e. half as many as Organization 7. 
Furthermore, relationships are equally distributed between core and peripheral members. 
This enables Organization 22 to obtain balanced access to organizations belonging to both 
structures.
The egocentric network of Organization 10 (subset of disseminators) has a more lim-
ited relational environment than the other organizations selected. Altogether it has seven 
links, four with central organizations and three with peripheral nodes. The distribution of 
relationships between the two structures is balanced, and there is evidence of a phenom-
enon characteristic of this type of key actor: their links are concentrated on organizations 
which in turn have few connections to each other. Organization 10 has relationships with 
loosely connected nodes, in contrast to the organizations mentioned previously, which have 
links with actors who in turn maintain multiple connections to each other. Indeed it is 
the only node that has ties to Organization 5 (a pendant node). Finally, Organization 11 19 
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Figure 4 
Egocentric networks representing the subgroups of disseminators and brokers 
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represents the subgroup of brokers. This node maintains sixteen links, nine of them with 
central organizations and seven with peripheral actors. The zone of influence of Organiza-
tion 7 spreads across both structures. A distinctive feature of disseminators is their ability 
to access cohesive subgroups formed by adjacent entities and organizations that have few 
contacts (such as Organizations 29 and 14). The next section explains our main findings. 
Figure 4
Egocentric networks representing the subgroups of disseminators and brokers
Source: Own elaboration.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper seeks to (a) highlight the impacts of subsets of key actors on network struc-
ture; (b) present different procedures for identifying those actors; and (c) show the role of 
centrality measures in creating SSC. Some elements that help understand the implications 
of this research should be emphasized: Central actors are able to exert influence on the 
subset in which they are embedded, but intermediaries, brokers, and disseminators extend 
their connections between the core and the periphery, and between the groups that make 
up the network. This finding suggests that degree of centrality is an appropriate measure 
for learning about the predominant roles of some actors within cohesive subgroups, while 
intermediaries, brokers, and disseminators are particularly influential when the objective is 
to assess inter-group relationships. 
Central actors have the power to affect the immediate structure, and thus to influence 
the actors with whom they are directly connected. But networks are formed by different 
components. Social networks tend to show a core-periphery structure in which the pro-
cesses and the dynamics of relationships are substantially different. This means that central 
actors can exert their power over those subgroups which are connected in a direct way, but 
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their influence may be lower in other subsets. The subgroup of disseminators is made up 
of actors who belong to different network components. They are located in the periphery 
and to a lesser extent in the core, enabling them to be connected to powerful actors within 
cohesive subgroups and to peripheral actors. The role of brokers between the core and the 
periphery gives them access to information that flows between the two areas. The optimal 
network configuration may be to strike a balance between being immersed in highly cohe-
sive local relationships and linked to multiple groups via weak ties. Empirical evidence on 
SSC addresses this issue and indicates that at individual level it is positive for there to be 
structural holes across which new information may flow (Burt 1992). From another per-
spective, Granovetter (1973) claims that SSC comes when there are low levels of transitiv-
ity. Few studies combine the two approaches to explain the generation of SSC at individual 
and collective levels (Borgatti et al. 1998; Ramos-Vidal 2015c). Both trends show that the 
influential actors are those capable of efficiently combining the two connectivity strategies.
But being immersed in different subgroups does not always involve competitive ad-
vantages. Engaging with different subgroups at the same time often means accepting the 
rules that shape the behavior of group members. Belonging to multiple components means 
accepting codes of conduct which may limit the independence and autonomy of actors, 
constraining their power to promote network interventions (Krackhardt 1999, p. 207). Be-
yond this view, bridging ties are important to connect several subsets and generate a struc-
ture that maximizes business opportunities, contributing to the stratification of the whole 
system (Watts 1999). This stresses the catalytic effect of micro-social processes in shaping 
macro-social systems (Burt 2000; Buskens and Van de Rijt 2008). 
By using different networks to test our approaches we have been able to identify vari-
ous groups of actors that are crucial in different types of relationship (Barringer and Har-
rison 2000). An organization may be highly active in establishing informal contacts and 
therefore be a key player articulating a particular kind of relationship. Nevertheless, an 
organization that is key in multiple relationships is more prominent because it can define 
network structures from different perspectives. 
A further element affecting the selection of key actors is the level of activity in estab-
lishing contacts. Relationships reflect complex phenomena. Creating links means investing 
time and resources, often in response to a planned strategy. Highly active nodes in develop-
ing informal relationships are actors who are perhaps not able to spend the time required to 
mature links. Social influence processes require direct and continuous interactions that call 
for time and resources (Marsden and Friedkin 1993; Hansen et al. 2001). To exert influence 
on a specific subset, it may be better to select nodes that have only a few links with actors 
belonging to different subgroups instead of choosing highly connected actors. The fact that 
they have fewer contacts means that they can invest more in developing trust and may this 
be able to adopt the role of influencers more effectively. 
Distinguishing between the four types of key actors leads us to the issue of whether all 
social influence processes could be implemented by the same actors. The choice of one 
subgroup or another depends on the purpose of the intervention (or influence process) to be 
performed. When the goal is to spread generic announcements or public events as quick-
ly as possible, implicating the subgroup of centrals and intermediaries could be enough. 
However when the goal is to produce deeper modifications (e.g. to make changes in market 
strategy or introduce new production methods) there is a need to develop strategies focused 
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on dissuasion through continuous, close interactions. For this second objective it may be 
more effective to enlist the support of disseminators and brokers, because they have fewer 
contacts and therefore have more time to develop their influence. The links of these actors 
are diversified, which gives them access to subunits. When the intervention is hybrid, i.e. 
when it pursues both large-scale dissemination and behavior changes in certain actors, it 
may be more suitable to choose different subsets of key actors. 
Before designing strategies and selecting actors, it is helpful to have some knowledge 
of some of the elements related to network dynamics that could affect intervention out-
comes. It is necessary to have information related to background and previous collabo-
ration paths. The presence of lobbies or actors with high formal and informal power may 
require alternative strategies to be developed to trigger structural changes. It is common for 
lobbyists to lead resistance movements that hamper intervention. To spread an intervention 
to the rest of the network it is essential to have the support of actors with a positive rep-
utation and actors who have previously led other processes of change (Gulati 1995; Burt 
1999; Watts and Dodds 2007; Provan et al. 2009). Early adoption of innovation by key 
actors could facilitate the success of interventions and their dissemination to other network 
members (Chesbrough and Crowther 2006).
Analyzing the interaction between centrality measures and the generating of structural 
holes provides relevant insights for determining the influence of specific types of link in 
generating SSC. This finding makes it possible to understand from a structural viewpoint 
why some organizations achieve better results than others. Organizations that build re-
lationships with diverse groups are able to access heterogeneous sources of information 
which may affect innovations positively (Obstfeld 2005; Uzzi and Spiro 2005). Organiza-
tions should carefully select the actors with whom they build alliances and design network-
ing strategies to reach different subgroups. By implementing such strategies it is possible 
to take advantage simultaneously of the opportunities provided by bonding and bridging 
ties (Hansen et al. 2001). 
The main contributions of this research are as follows: (a) it shows different strategies 
for identifying key actors; (b) it compares their properties; and (c) it describes the potential 
advantages of using each type of key actor for implementing different types of structural 
intervention. Through SNA, organizations are identified that may disseminate information, 
introduce new methods or promote the adoption of good managerial practices. The pro-
cedures set out here could accelerate the processes mentioned above by amplifying inter-
vention effects and optimizing the resources allocated to them. Nevertheless, for structural 
intervention strategies based on detection key actors to be successful it is vital to gather 
information about the context in which interactions occur, and about the political and eco-
nomic factors that determine the configuration of social networks. 
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